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Abstract
Security of Critical National Infrastructures (CNI) is one of the major concerns to
countries both in a European and in a worldwide level. Training on scenarios that
involve such systems is important to the effective handling of incidents. This article
describes a final year module for teaching traffic anomaly detection to Computer
Science and Informatics students at the De Montfort University. Students learn how
to combine programming, data mining and security skills in order to build their own
Intrusion Detection System using data from a small-scale SCADA testbed.
KEYWORDS:
Intrusion Detection Systems; Pedagogy; Machine Learning; Datasets, SCADA
1 INTRODUCTION
Over recent years network and information security has evolved into a primary field in information and communication tech-
nology research. Computer departments of Universities around the globe are incorporating modules or classes that are offering
cyber-security related material. At a national level countries published their National Cyber Security Strategies, many contain-
ing clear statements in support of research and development programs and academic educational programs in the field of cyber
security. Among the objectives is the collaboration to enhance cyber security across all levels, from threat information sharing, to
awareness raising To achieve this at a European level, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has launched earlier
this year a cyber platform to coordinate education, training, evaluation and exercises (ETEE) in the field of cyber security/defence
across Europe.
Security of Critical National Infrastructures (CNI) is one of the major concerns at a European and worldwide level1. Europe
has issued the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) which is the first piece of EU-wide
legislation on cybersecurity of critical infrastructures (CIs). Supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) systems
are essential for the safe and reliable operation of CIs and during the recent years they have become the target of advanced cyber-
attacks due to their convergence with public and corporate networks mainly for easier monitoring and control. Moreover, there
is an increased industry demand in cyber security training for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA2. These factors
make the training on scenarios that involve such systems very important3.
This article describes a final year course for teaching an important class of network securitymethods: traffic anomaly detection.
The course is targeted at Computer Science and Informatics students and uses data from a small-scale SCADA testbed from
University of Coimbra, which contains traffic from a variety of different network attacks targeting ICS systems.
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2 RELATED WORK
In order to minimize the risk of inappropriate student behavior, Trabelsi and Saleous4 presented the fundamental concepts
students must understand: network keylogging and eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, the students are put into groups of three
and given three machines, which have CommView, a network analyzer, and packet sniffing software tool, installed. The Local
Area Network (LAN) is used to expose the network eavesdropping, or sniffing, attacks.
For understanding security auditing methods, Zseby et al.5 proposed a project for teaching network traffic anomaly detection
methods using a large IP darkspace monitor operated at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). The exercises are
based on four software tools, including, tcpdump, corsaro, MATLAB, and RapidMiner. Teaching basic game theory has been
used by Hamman et al.6 to improve adversarial thinking in Cybersecurity students.7
Thompson et al.8 proposed a new RFID reference model for teaching RFID systems under the RFID INFOSEC project. The
RFID INFOSEC project focuses on RFID-related security and privacy threats, risks and mitigation technologies. There are
six modules that each include many lessons on INFOSEC RFIDZseby et al.5 introduced a network security laboratory project
to educate students in electrical engineering on methods for the detection of network traffic anomalies. Lee et al.9 proposed
a small competition-based network security lab, named NetSecLab, for teaching system and network security. Through the
NetSecLab project, students learn how to install the specified Linux distribution, configure the required services, and investigate
attack techniques. Xu et al.10 proposed a cloud-based virtual laboratory education platform, named V-Lab, for network security
education.
Numerous Universities around the globe are incorporating in their programs specialized modules that are related to cyber
security.In some of those modules cyber security training and simulation platforms, so-called cyber-ranges, are used in order to
enhance the involvement of students in realistic situations in operational or strategic level11. De Montfort University in addition
to providing those modules, decided some years ago to teach students how to built from scratch an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). The IDS is based on the principles of One Class Support Vector Machine classifier, combining both basic programming
in JAVA, Python, use of Machine Learning methods and experimentation with realistic datasets from a small scale SCADA
testbed that were provided by the University of Coimbra under the CockpitCI project12.
3 APPROACH & EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
DMU’s Cyber Technology Institute, is recognised as an Airbus Centre of Excellence in SCADA cyber security and forensics,
offers lectures about security concepts along with labs that complement the acquired knowledge with hands-on experiments.
Specific modules about cyber threat Intelligence, incident response, forensics, industrial control systems security and privacy
have been developed in order to give to students, both undergraduate and postgraduate, a holistic training in cyber security. The
educational objectives of the ICS Intrusion Detection System module are the following:
• Teach students basic network data analysis methods. During the module, students get familiarized with network data traces
analysis, data features, statistical methods and ensemble learning.
• Provide students with insights on intrusion vector strategic handling and exploitation by means of hands-on exercises
• Enhance students’ network security knowledge. Students gain knowledge about attacks that can target ICS systems.
Datasets containing layer 2/3/4 attacks like FIN/SYN Scan and SYN Flooding along with SCADA protocol and
process-level attacks are used and analyzed.
• Help students learn how an IDS is built. During the lab student built several components of an IDS that include, capturing
of raw data, data preprocessing, creation of alerts, ensemble of outcomes from different classifiers, aggregation and fusion
techniques.
• Enable student’s general scientific skills. Students learn how to solve simple to complex problems, take right or wrong
decisions and deal with difficult circumstances.
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FIGURE 1 Building an IDS Step by step
4 KEY DESIGN DECISIONS
The module was set up in a way that students would learn how to implement their own IDS using TCPdump, JAVA, WEKA and
Python capabilities. Following the steps as shown in Figure 1 students learn how to capture live traffic using TCPdump.When
dealing with a classification problem, feature extraction is an essential step that once implement correctly helps the creation
of an efficient method. Most classification methods cannot process data in such a format and pre-processing is required before
classification models can be built and trained. During the data pre-processing phase, students build their own classes that can
select features or create new ones.
The following labs involve familiarization of the students with using WEKA by calling specific procedures from JAVA,
running several classification methods and setting up parameters such as kernel type, gamma, number of outliers, number of
clusters, etc depending on the classification method that is used. Students also learn how to create different classifiers that can
work in parallel using the same or similar data sets and how to combine their outcomes by ensemble based mechanisms that use
mean majority voting. Also additional fusion mechanisms that are based on clustering, e.g. K-means clustering are introduced
to the class.
In order to be able to build an IDS that can be integrated in a general defence mechanism, students learn how to create IDMEF
files. IDMEF is the standard format for exchanging intrusion detection related events. A typical IDMEF file produced by our
system is shown in Figure 2. Each IDMEF message contains information regarding the source of the attack (lines 11-17), the
time that the attack was detected (line 10), the method (line 7) that detected it (When multiple IDS exist inside the defence
mechanism), an initial classification of the detected attack (line 25) along with any other information that we want to encapsulate
(line 6 & lines 18-24). Knowledge of the source node where the intrusion originates from or the attack is first detected is a very
important feature of any IDS systems.
The reference testbed provided to the students (see Figure 3) emulates a Cyber-Physical process (comprising operations and
field networks) controlled by a SCADA system using the Modbus/TCP protocol, being integrated within a layered IEC 62443-
like structure13. It consists of a liquid pump simulated by an electric motor controlled by a Variable Frequency Drive (VFD),
allowing multiple rotor speeds. The VFD is controlled by a Modicon M340 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). The motor
speed is determined by a set of predefined liquid temperature thresholds, whosemeasurement is provided by aMODBUSRemote
Terminal Unit (RTU) device providing a temperature gauge. This is simulated by a potentiometer connected to an Arduino -
the microcontroller is connected to a wired ethernet network by means of a expansion board with a Wiznet 5100 ASIC. The
PLC communicates horizontally with the RTU, providing insightful knowledge of how this type of communications may have
an effect on the overall system. The PLC also communicates with the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) which provides the
supervisory interface for the system.
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FIGURE 3 Cyber-physical process testbed
4.1 Attacks as a security measure
As a preliminary step, and after learning the necessary basics of traffic capture and analysis procedures, students are encouraged
to plan and execute a series of attacks against the testbed infrastructure, from scouting or classic Denial of Service (DoS) flooding
procedures to process-level manipulation. The main rationale for this step-by-step approach is to provide students with a good
insight about intrusion vectors and their strategic handling and exploitation by means of hands-on exercises. This is considered
a valuable prior step before students proceed to the implementation of the IDS components.
Regarding DoS attacks, several categories are implemented, such as ping, TCP SYN or Modbus query flooding, all targeting
the PLC. While the first two attacks operate mostly at OSI layers 2 to 4, attempting to overwhelm the capacity of the network
or the networking subsystem in the target device with requests (TCP SYN flood attacks try to induce resource exhaustion in the
TCP/IP stack due to a series of incomplete connection attempts), the third attack works at the SCADA protocol layer, flooding
the device with Modbus read request operations for a series of PLC register addresses, which may lead to side effects such as
device resource exhaustion, scan cycle latency deviations or loss of connectivity. The first two attacks are usually implemented
using the the hping3 and nping tools, which are capable of generating conventional DoS attacks and simulated DDoS by spoofing
the packet’s IP address (specifically, by setting the source with a random valid IP address). The third attack was generated using
the SMOD tool. Moreover, a public dataset14 was generated for these attacks, which was used for research purposes15.
When moving towards the execution of more sophisticated attacks, students are taught how to execute man-in-the-middle
interception procedures (using ARP spoofing or DNS poisoning) using the ettercap tool,being asked to perform a two-step
man-in-the-middle interception procedure between the PLC and the HMI. In the first stage ARP poisoning is used to steer the
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communications through a third-party opponent, for scouting purposes - students are encouraged to capture and analyse SCADA
traffic, in order to better understand the nature of the process under control, as well as the variables/registers involved in the
device interaction workflow. Once students reach a viable conclusion about the relevant registers and their functions within the
process model, the second stage takes place: students write ettercap scripts to disrupt the process behaviour by means of inflight
manipulation of Modbus registers, while hiding the intrusion by feeding false data to the operator HMI (therefore blinding it).
4.2 IDS Evaluation
In order to be able to evaluate the efficiency of the IDS in terms of accuracy and communication, each student is given with
labeled datasets that contain several attacks extracted from the testbed. Also during the last week, students try their trained IDSs
during real time attacks. The lab is isolated and tutors of the lab are creating DoS and DDoS attacks against a random machine
inside the network. The attack unfolds in a progressive way, starting with a few packets per minute to scale up to thousands of
packets per second. By using their IDS, students try to identify the attack while also competing with each other in terms of time,
accuracy and quality of alerting.
In order to evaluate the performance of their IDS, students learn to use several metrics, that represent the quality of the detec-
tion mechanism. On the one hand they learn how to compute important performance indicators, including, Detection Rate (DR),
False Alarm Rate (FAR), Recall, Precision and Accuracy (ACC). These metrics can be used in order to evaluate the capability
of the IDS to correctly classify each event inside the network. On the other hand other performance metrics, such as compu-
tational cost and communication overhead are calculated in order to measure the complexity of an IDS. Computational cost is
measured as the total time required to perform classification of the dataset and output the final alarms, while communication
overhead is measured by the number of IDMEF files that the IDS createsCommunication overhead and accuracy must be bal-
anced in a way that the IDS identifies an anomaly correctly and fast, while on the same time it doesn’t overwhelm the HMI with
false or repeated alarms that could seriously affect the efficiency and usability of the detection mechanism.
5 DISCUSSION
The module consists of 12 weeks labs and lectures and is run in DMU, following a structure co-designed and developed together
with a team from the University of Coimbra (UC), where some lectures and exercises are also used as part of a cyber security
course. During this period, students learn how to combine programming, data mining and security skills in order to build their
own Intrusion Detection System. Basic knowledge about IP networks, as well as basic experience with programming (preferably
Java or Python) and shell scripting, are expected of students enrolled in the module. The IDS that students produce can run
in a distributed way and can be combined with other security mechanisms. The basic model that the module is based on was
one of the outcomes of the CockpitCI FP7 project and it was already tested in realistic circumstances. Students that have basic
knowledge on programming can cope easily with the module and can get their hands on implementation and experimentation
in realistic environments. When the students finish the module they have acquired the knowledge needed in order to deploy an
ML based IDS including all the necessary steps that include data capturing and preprocessing, creation, ensemble, aggregation
and fusion of alarms.
In the near future we are planning to further improve the module by incorporating the IDS inside a hybrid testbed, entitled
CYRAN11, that members of our lab have already implemented and used both for awareness and teaching purposes, mostly
for red blue team exercises. CYRAN is a realistic environment used for cyber warfare training, cyber resiliency testing, cyber
technology development and for the collection of labelled datasets for further research.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The CTI lab teaches network traffic anomaly detection security implementation for ICS systems, to computer science and infor-
matics students.The lab follows a research-oriented teaching approach and uses realistic network traffic from a small-scale
SCADA testbed along with real time attack scenarios in order to help students react in difficult situations and solve problems by
combining different techniques. The implementation of the module gives the students the ability to gain technical and problem
solving skills that are required when dealing with real problems.
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